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RECENT CASE NOTES
res gestae, because his investigation and inquiry necessarily broke the
continuity between the main facts sought to be elicited and the narrative
given of it. Itzkowitz v. Renbel & Co., 250 S. W. 535. Evidence of a conversation with the foreman of a shop, who had seen an employee injured,
was excluded although the conversation was held soon after the accident.
McKinon v. Norcross, 20 N. E. 183; Supreme Council, etc. v. Quarles, 97
S. E. 557.
It has been said that each case involving the question of res gestae
must be determined in the light of its own facts, because varying conditions alter the application of the rule so materially. When there are connecting circumstances, declarations even though made some time after
the transaction, may form a part of the whole res gestae. Ins. Co. v.
Mosley, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 397. And the fact that the statements were made
in the course of conversation with a third person, not a party to the transaction, does not necessarily indicate that it was premeditated and therefore not part of the res gestae. Pratt v. State, 96 S. W. 8. A confession
made while under arrest, and therefore incompetent as a confession, was
held admissible as part of the res gestae. Powers v. State, 5 S. W. 153.
The fact that a statement was made in response to an inquiry indicates
that it was not entirely spontaneous, and this alone has been held sufficient
to require exclusion of the statement when offered as being within the
res gestae. However, other circumstances may sufficiently show that the
statement was spontaneous in spite of its being made in response to a
question. Especially is this true when the statement is inculpatory or
against interest. Head v. State, 44 Miss. 731.
It is entirely possible that in another jurisdiction the proffered evidence
might have been admitted as part of the res gestae on the theory that
Green's statements to the officer must have been spontaneously made and
while under the influence of the main transaction, for it is improbable
that a man would admit a homicide so glibely, and (seemingly) without
compulsion. The decision as handed down, however, is in accord with
the vast majority of cases on the subject.
J. W. S.
INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN PLAINTIFF'S BRINGING SUIT IN ANOTHER
JURISDICTION-Appellee was injured in 1927 while working as yard switchman in appellant's yards at Indianapolis. In 1928, appellee brought an
action in Missouri court to recover for such injuries. The appellant is a
corporation duly organized in Indiana and Ohio and operates steam railroad lines through these states as well as through Illinois. Appellant
brings present action to restrain such suit. The lower court denied the
injunction. Held: Judgment reversed. It would be inequitable to permit
appellee to try case at a distance since it would cause appellant needless
and irreparable damage and give to appellee an inequitable and unfair
advantage. C., C., C. and St. L. R. R. v. Shelley, 170 N. E. 328, Appellate
Court, February 25, 1930.
The problem considered here is the power of a court to enjoin a person
from prosecuting a transitory cause of action in a foreign jurisdiction.
Chambers v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 207 U. S. 142 (1907), 28 S. C. R. 34. It
would seem that the Missouri and Minnesota courts have been the haven
Weinard v.
for parties seeking damages against railroad corporations.
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Chicago, M. and St. P. R. R., 298 Fed. 977 (Dist. Minn., 1924); Winders
v. Ill. Central R. R., (Minn.) 223 N. W. 291. While it is clear that a
court of equity will not restrain the prosecution of a suit in a foreign jurisdiction unless a clear equity is presented. Massie v. Watts, U. S. 1810,
9 Cr. 148, 3 L. Ed. 181; it is equally clear that upon the showing of
proper. cause, a citizen of the state may obtain an injunction against
another citizen of the same state enjoining the prosecution of an action
in a foreign state. Reeds' Admtx. v. Illinois Central R. R., 206 S. W. 794
(1918).
However, such injunction may not be recognized by the courts
where such action is being prosecuted, and this without violating the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution. State ex rel. Bossung v.
District Court, (Minn.) 168 N. W. 589, 140 Minn. 494, 1 A. L. R. 145;
Frye v. Chicago, R. I. and P. R. R., 195 N. W. 629, 196 N. W. 280, 157
Minn. 52, appeal denied, 263 U. S. 723, 44 S. C. R. 231, 68 L. Ed. 525.
See 39 Y. L. R. 719. This view, however, has not been recognized in some
jurisdictions. Fisher v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 72 So. 846, 112
Miss. 30.
It is quite generally conceded that an equity court may act in restraining the prosecution of an action where it has jurisdiction of the parties.
Cameron & Co. v. Abbott, 258 S. W. 563 (Texas); Sandage v. Studebaker
Co., 142 Ind. 148; Cole v. Cunninham, 133 U. S. 107; Hawkins v. Ireland,
64 Minn. 339, 67 N. W. 73. Such injunction is not a denial of one's access
to the courts. Kansas City R. R. Co. v. McCardle, 232 S. W. 464.
It is also conceded that in deciding cases under the Employers' Liability Act (U. S. C. A. 51-59), the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal courts. Witort v. Chicago & N. W. R. R., 226 N.
W. 934, 24 Ill. L. R. 467. But it is another question as to whether such
jurisdiction is mandatory upon the state courts. Some jurisdictions have
held that it is. Bright v. Wheelock, 20 S. W. (2d) 684, while a recent
United States Supreme Court case holds it is not so, Douglas v. N. Y.,
N. H. and H. R. R., 49 S. C. R. 355. Such an action in a foreign jurisdiction has been held not to be a burden on Interstate Commerce. Hoffman
v. Missouri, 47 S. C. R. 485, although a contrary doctrine seems to have
been laid down in Davis v. Farmers' Cooperative Co., 262 U. S. 312. See
Minn. L. R. 485. However, the later case does not lay down a hard and
fast rule that an action can never be entertained by courts of a state in
which the cause of action did not arise. If residence is not bona fide, but
merely secured for the purpose of bringing the suit, the state court may
decline jurisdiction. Michigan Cent. R. R. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492. It
should be noted, however, that a state could not enjoin the prosecution of
the suit in a competent Federal court. Chicago, M. and St. P. R. R. v.
Schendel, 292 Fed. 326 (C. C. A., 8th, 1923); Clark v. Bankers' Trust Co.,
164 N. Y. S. 544.
Contra to the instant case, there are recent decisions to consider. That
a large number of witnesses reside in the state where the cause of action
arose is not sufficient ground upon which an injunction may be granted.
A clear case of oppression, fraud, or hardship, must be presented.
Missouri-Kansas R. R. v. Ball, 271 Pac. 313 (Kans., 1929) ; Chicago, M. &
St. P. R. R. v. MeGinley, 175 Wisc. 565, 185 N. W. 218. The fact that a
view by jurors of premises where the accident occurred may not be had

RECENT CASE NOTES
in the foreign state is not a hardship, oppression, or fraud as will warrant
granting an injunction. Missouri-Kansas R. R. v. Ball, supra. It seems
clear, however, that the instant case is in harmony with the weight of
A. W. E.
American authority.
INTOXICATING LIQuoR-PossEssIoN-SUFFICIENCY

OF EVIDENCE-CREDI-

BILITY OF WITNESSES-ORAL ARGUMENT-Appellant was convicted, after
trial, upon affidavit charging unlawful possession of liquor under Sec. 4,
Chap. 45, Acts 1925, Burns' Ann. St., Sec. 2717, and sentenced to serve
not less than one and not more than two years in the State Prison.
State's evidence, besides an agreed stipulation showing two prior convictions, consisted of the testimony of the arresting officer, that in searching appellant's house he found two gallons of moonshine whiskey in a
hideout under a closet in a room occupied by appellant. Appellant denied
knowledge of the whiskey and testified that he had moved into that room
the dvy before, when it was vacated by Fennoff, who had occupied it
theretofore. Fennoff testified for appellant that he found the whiskey and
put it in the hideout. Appellant assigns as error the overruling of motion
for new trial based on the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding of the court. Held: Affirmed. Malich v. State, Supreme Court of
Indiana, January 15, 1930, 169 N. E. 531.
The first question raised is what constitutes possession under the
statute. Branarn v. State, 165 N. E. 314, decides it means actual physical
control and that ownership and exclusive possession are not essential
elements, and that the possession must be conscious. The Indiana cases
so holding have been considering the statute covering possession with
intent to sell. This case involves the same elements of possession without
regard to intent or motive required under that statute. The cases from
other jurisdictions support the proposition that knowledge is an essential
element under statutes similar to the one in question. State v. Harris,
(Ore.) 211 Pac. 944; Nelson v. State, (Wis.) 203 N. W. 343, and State v.
Gates, (N. D.) 204 N. W. 350, in which an instruction, "that if liquor was
taken from a room vacated by a lodger and put in defendant's room without his knowledge by his wife, that defendant would not be in possession,
but if that claim was believed to be a subterfuge and you are satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew of its presence, then you
,will convict," was upheld. 33 Corp. Juris. 585 supports the principle that
knowledge is an essential element under a statute making possession alone
a crime.
Appellant put the question of knowledge in issue by his testimony and
that of Fennoff, in rebutting the acknowledged presumption of knowledge
arising from actual possession. In determining whether evidence was
sufficient to sustain a finding or verdict, only evidence favorabie to the
prevailing party can be considered with inferences and conclusions drawn
therefrom, and the court will not weigh the evidence. MeDonough V.
U. S., 299 Fed. 30; Sloan v. U. S., 287 Fed. 91; Moore v. State, (Ark.)
267 S. W. 769; State v. Brown, (Mo.) 198 S. W. 177; Dennison v. State,
191 Ind. 232; Bohan v. State, 194 Ind. 237; State v. Sullivan, (W. Va.)
47 S. E. 267; Rosenberg v. State, 192 Ind. 485. The inferences must be

